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1Introduction
Alcohol regulation has a long and storied history in the United States. While
prohibition is probably the most well known event in that history, there is also
an interesting and complex story to be told about the regulation of alcohol label-
ing. For over 50 years, two government administrative agencies, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF), and their precursors, have both competed and cooperated in the reg-
ulation of alcoholic beverage labeling. This complex agency interaction has
important implications for any attempt to add a health claim on wine labels
noting the connection between moderate consumption of wine and reduced risks
of heart disease.
This paper has two main goals. First, it will provide a history of the FDA-
ATF relationship with regard to jurisdiction over alcoholic beverage labeling
regulation. This part of the paper will be largely descriptive in nature and
will relate the areas in which the two agencies have competed and cooperated.
Second, the paper will consider the possibility of adding a health claim to wine
labels. This part will analyze both the FDA's regulation of health claims on
food labels and recent revisions of the FDA's statutory mandate in order to
explore the possibility of gaining government approval for a wine health claim.
Section I. Jurisdictional Conict and Cooperation
While Washington is the scene of many great political dramas, some of
the most interesting and least publicized are those that occur between admin-
istrative agencies. The history of alcoholic beverage labeling regulation has
been profoundly aected by the periods of conict and cooperation between
the FDA and the ATF. This awkward inter-agency relationship has occurred
because Congress has granted both agencies the jurisdiction to regulate alco-
holic beverage labels at various times during the 20th century. Though the two
agencies have
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attempted to resolve this jurisdictional overlap themselves by means of mem-
orandums of understanding, this has not prevented court involvement in the
process. This rst part of the paper will explore the relationship between the
FDA and the ATF with respect to alcohol labeling regulation so that its impli-
cations for the labeling of a health claim on wine can be explored in the second
part which follows.
A. Congressional and Executive Mandates
The federal government's involvement in the regulation of the food supply
began with the passage of the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906.1 This act,
which among other things prohibited the misbranding of food, dened food to
include articles used for...drink. . .by man. 2 Subsequent court cases conrmed
that this denition of food did indeed include alcoholic beverages.3 The Food,
Drug and Insecticide Administration (later shortened in name to the FDA) was
created in 1927 to administer this act. The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)4 continued to use the 1906 denition of food and x343(i) of this new act
required ingredient labeling for all foods which did not conform to a standard
of identity. Since the FDA never issued standards of identity for alcoholic bev-
erages, this section mandated ingredient labeling of alcoholic beverages. Thus,
it was clear that Congress originally intended alcoholic beverages to be subject
to the same regulation as the rest of the food supply and that the FDA
34 Stat. 768 (1906); 21 U.S.C. c. 1.
2 Id, x6.
~ United States v. 36 Bottles of London Dry Gin, 210 Fed. 271
(CA-3, 1914); United States v. 60 Barrels of Wine, 225 Fed. 846 (D.C. W.D.
Mo. 1915); United States v. Five Cases of Champagne, 205 Fed. 817 (D.C.
N.D.N.Y. 1913); Un ited States v. 50 Barrels of Whiskey, 165 Fed. 966 (D.C.
Md. 1908).
~ 52 Stat. 1059 (1938).
3had the authority to administer this regulation.
Prohibition resulted in a separate line of regulation of alcoholic beverages,
however, that grew out of executive branch action. After the repeal of Prohi-
bition by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933, the Roosevelt administration
wanted to maintain control over those phases of alcoholic beverage trac that
could not be eectively controlled by the states.5 Thus, the Federal Alcohol
Control Administration (FACA) was established during the 1933 Congressional
recess by an executive order issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA).6 One of this agency's primary purposes was to protect the consumer
against deception from false and misleading labeling and advertising of alcoholic
beverages where mislabeling was dened as the use of labels which were not in
compliance with the Food and Drug Act.7
After the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935, Congress immedi-
ately passed the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) which created the
Federal Alcohol Administration (FAA) within the Department of the Treasury.8
The FAAA created a permit system which required that all alcohol labels be
approved by the FAA. FAAA x205(e) also gave the FAA the discretion to re-
quire that labels furnish consumers with information that would advise them
of the identity, quality, and net contents of alcoholic beverages. The legislative
history of the
Hancock, Mary, Federal Jurisdictional Disputes in the Labeling and Adver-
tising of Malt Beverages, 34 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 271, 272 (1979).
6 Exec. Order No. 6474 (Dec. 4, 1933).
Cooper, Iver P., The FDA, the BA TF, and Liquor Labeling: A Case Study
of Interagency Conict, 34 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 370, 372 (1979).
~ 49 Stat. 977 (1935). This agency was absorbed into the Alcohol
Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1940 and was later spun o as
the ATF under the Department of the Treasury in 1972.
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FAAA indicates that this provision was not meant to just prohibit false
statements but was also intended to ensure that consumers would be provided
with all the important factors which were of interest [to them] about what was
in the bottle.9
The regulations issued by the FAA did not require ingredient labeling on
alcoholic beverages but did prohibit, among other things, statements that were
indicative of curative or therapeutic eects if they were either untrue or would
tend to create a misleading impression in the minds of consumers.'0 Thus, it
is clear that while the FAAA went much further in positive demands upon
producers [to] advise the public of the nature of their products than any earlier
legislation with respect to liquor or any other product not actually dangerous,
the FAA never did exercise that full authority. Curiously, therefore, neither the
FDA nor the FAA exercised the full measure of their regulatory jurisdiction over
alcoholic beverage labeling.
The rst attempt to reconcile the overlapping jurisdictional grants of the
FDA and the FAA occurred shortly after the abolishment of the FAA by the
Reorganization Act of 1939. This action transferred the s duties to the Alcohol
Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. On April 11, 1940, the FDA stated
that while it had concurrent jurisdiction over alcohol labeling it was adopting a
policy of deferral to the Alcohol Tax Unit in order to avoid duplication of eort.
This was formalized in a Trade Correspondence as follows:
Statement of Joseph H. Choate, Jr., Hearings on HR. 8539 Before the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), at 10.
10 27 CFR x7.29.
~ Russell, T., Controls over Labeling and Advertising ofAlcoholic Beverages,
7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 645, 649 (1940).
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While we have indicated that cordials, liquors, wine and whisky [and beer]
are subject to the Act [of 1938], we will continue as in the past to leave [regu-
lation of] labeling of these alcoholic beverages under the more specic Federal
Alcohol Administration Act.'2
This policy of deferral by the FDA was destined not to last, however.
Two events in particular illustrate that the jurisdictional lines were not
clearly dened nor
respected after this memorandum of understanding. First, after a ood in
Missouri washed labels o of bottles in several breweries and distilleries in 1954,
the FDA took legal action to seize the bottles for violations of the misbrand-
ing provisions of the 1938 FDCA.'3 Then in 1962, the Alcohol and Tax Unit
told distillery owners that the issuance of certicates of label approval under
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act .. .does not waive their responsibili-
ties to observe the laws and regulations administered by the Food and Drug
Administration.'4 Thus, clearly both agencies still felt that the FDA had some
jurisdiction over alcoholic beverage labeling.
The next attempt to resolve the jurisdictional overlap was spurred by the
1972 eort by the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) to force the
government to mandate ingredient labeling on all alcoholic beverages. CSPI's
eorts were motivated by two specic events. The rst was a 1964 incident in
which 47 people in Canada and the U.S. died from cobalt poisoning resulting
from the interaction between by the cobalt sulfate used as a foam stabilizer in
beer and the alcohol contained in the beer. The second motivating event was the
1971 discovery by Swedish scientists that the preservative diethylpyrocarbonate
(DEPC), used in
12 Trade Correspondence No. 224 (April 11, 1940).
United States v. 1,800.2625 Wine Gallons of Distilled Spirits, 121 F.Supp.
735 (D.C. W.D. Mo. 1954). 14 Industry Circular No. 62-33 (Oct. 26, 1962).
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both beer and wine, reacted with the ammonia contained in these beverages
to form the carcinogen urethan. As a result of these events, CSPI petitioned
FDA to enforce the FDCA ingredient labeling provisions and also petitioned
the ATF to exercise its discretion under the FAAA to declare the withholding
of ingredient information on alcoholic beverages misleading.
The FDA deferred to the ATF in this matter after the ATF agreed to issue
ingredient labeling regulations. This deferral was formalized in another memo-
randum of understanding in which the ATF was designated as the agency with
primary responsibility for promulgating alcohol beverage labeling regulations
pursuant to the FAAA as long as those regulations were also consistent with
the food labeling requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the
regulations promulgated thereunder.'5 One analysis of the language of this mem-
orandum of understanding has led to the conclusion that it did not involve a
subdelegation of the FDA's regulatory authority to the ATF and therefore the
ATF's regulatory jurisdiction is still based on FAAA x205 rather than FDCA
x343.16
The ATF did propose ingredient labeling regulations based largely on a vol-
untary proposal by the Brewers' Association of America.17 However, on Novem-
ber 11, 1975, the ATF withdrew these proposals based upon several claims the
most believable of which were that the cost of ingredient labeling would exceed
the benets to consumers and that aging would change
'~ 39 F.R. 32617 (Oct. 8, 1974).
16
Cooper, supra note 7, at 382. Although Cooper states that statutory autho-
rization is necessary for joint rule making and admits that this does not exist
with respect to the FDA and the ATF, he still calls for the ATF to include the
FDA in an Interagency Committee on Federal Activities for Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism and cites the cooperation between the FDA and the FTC as a model
for the FDA and the ATF. Id., at 384.
17 ~ F.R. 27812 (Aug. 1, 1974).
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the contents of alcoholic beverages in such a way that labels would be inaccu-
rate and possibly misleading.'8 Two weeks after the ATF withdrew its proposed
regulations, the FDA revoked its 1974 memorandum of understanding and an-
nounced that it would begin to enforce its own requirements for the ingredient
labeling of alcoholic beverages by January 1, 1977.
Thus, on May 5, 1976, the FDA issued a booklet illustrating proposed al-
coholic beverage labels.19 The relationship between the FDA and the ATF at
this point was still far from strained, however. On June 16, 1976, ocials of
both the FDA and the ATF met to discuss the labeling issue. At this meeting,
FDA Commissioner Schmidt stated that the FDA would be willing to enter into
another memorandum of understanding in which the FDA would accept current
ATF approved labels as being in compliance with the FDCA for all aspects of
alcoholic beverages except for ingredient labeling. Commissioner Schmidt also
stated that the FDA was willing to work together with the ATF to develop reg-
ulations which would satisfy the requirements of FDCA x343.20 This attempt at
reconciliation did not succeed, however, and the next stage of the relationship
between the two agencies occurred in the courts.
B. Court Involvement
The alcoholic beverage industry had a mixed reaction to the dialogue be-
tween the FDA and the ATF on the issue of ingredient labeling. While the U.S.
Brewers' Association was willing to work with the FDA, representatives of the
distilled spirits and wine industries brought
18 40 F.R. 52613 (Nov. 11, 1975).
'~ 41 F.R. 18538 (May 5, 1976).
20 Cooper, supra note 7, at 376.
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suit seeking a declaratory judgement that the FDA had no authority to reg-
ulate the labeling of alcoholic beverages. This suit was strategically brought
in the Western District Court of Kentucky which was the heart of the whisky
country. In November 1976, this court held that the ATF had exclusive ju-
risdiction to regulate the labeling of alcoholic beverages because Congress had
intended FAAA x205 to govern alcoholic beverage labeling to the exclusion of
FDCA x343. The court stated that this conclusion was supported by the fact
that there was a history of deferral by the FDA to the ATF.21 It has been argued
that this decision was incorrect and that by denying the FDA concurrent juris-
diction over alcohol labeling along with the ATF, the court eectively denied
the expression of Congressional will as embodied in the FDCA.22
The FDA wanted to appeal this decision but on July 20, 1977, the Oce of
Management and Budget (0MB) stepped in and decided that it should not be
appealed because the ATF could most eciently and eectively administer alco-
holic beverage regulations. 0MB did recognize, however, that the FDA's stated
concerns about the right of consumers to be informed of hidden or potentially
harmful ingredients in alcoholic beverages were valid. Thus, the 0MB ruled
that the FDA and the ATF should work together to develop partial ingredient
labels and that special focus should be placed on assuring that consumers are
made aware of hidden and potentially harmful ingredients...and on reducing the
economic burden on manufacturers of providing such data.23 This was not the
end, however, of court involvement in the labeling saga.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. S (W.D. D.C. Ky.
1976), at 16. 22 Cooper, supra note 7, at 389.
23 Hancock, supra note 5, at 280.
99
In response to the 0MB decision, the ATF issued a nal rule containing
ingredient labeling regulations for all alcoholic beverages.24 These regulations,
which were to become mandatory on January 1, 1983, required the disclosure
of ingredients used in the production of alcoholic beverages either by placing
an ingredient list directly on the alcoholic beverage label or by providing a
U.S. mailing address on the label where such ingredient information would be
made available. The regulations also required producers to disclose the presence
of FD&C Yellow No. 5 because this additive had been determined to be a
potentially harmful allergen by the FDA.
In response to President Reagan's Executive Order 12291 which directed
government agencies to conduct cost-benet analyses of all existing regulations,
the ATF decided to rescind its ingredient labeling rule.25 The ATF based this
decision on the conclusion that the labeling regulations would increase costs to
consumers and burdens on industry which are not commensurate with the ben-
ets that might ow from the additional label information and would not result
in an appreciable benet to consumers when compared to the existing label in-
formation requirements and standards of identity.26 Thus, the ATF abandoned
its labeling regulations before they even took eect.
After this action, CSPI brought suit in the Federal District Court in Wash-
ington, D.C. claiming that the ATF's recision violated the FAAA and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act
24 ~ FR. 40538 (June 13, 1980).
25 46 F.R. 55093 (November 6, 1981).
26
Id,at 55094.
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(APA). The court held that FAAA x205 did express a Congressional intent
to provide the ATF with the discretion to issue regulations which it felt would
provide consumers with information about the quality and identity of alcoholic
beverages.27 However, the court held that because the FAAA did not condition
such a grant of authority with a proviso that the regulations could be withdrawn
if the costs to the industry turned out to be too high, the ATF's action violated
the
FAAA.28
The court further held that because the ATF did not consider the costs of
the address label option in its decision to rescind the regulations, it had acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner that violated the APA.29 Finally, the
court held that the existing label information and standards of identity would
not suciently protect consumer interests. The court noted that standards only
existed for wine and distilled spirits and not malt beverages and that it was clear
from the FD&C Yellow No. 5 incident that the ATF's maintenance of standards
of identity had not been sucient to protect consumers because there was no
automatic linkage between the FDA's regulation of food labels and the ATF's
regulation of alcoholic beverage labels.30
Although the ATF appealed this decision, it did reinstate the labeling regulations.3'
During the period of time in which the appeal arguments were being heard, the
ATF conducted
27 Center for Science in the Public Interest, et al., v Department of the
Treasury, et al., 573 F.Supp 1168 (D.C. D.C., February 9, 1983).
28 Id., at 1174.
29 Id., at 1176.
~ Id., at 1177.
~' 48 FR. 10309 (March 11, 1983).
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another review of its labeling regulations. Once again it concluded that
the costs of providing full ingredient information to consumers outweighed the
benets and rescinded the regulations. This second recision was justied by
the ATF on the grounds that consumers had not revealed an overwhelming
desire for full ingredient disclosure, the transformation of alcoholic beverage
ingredients after production made it impossible to label accurately, the cost of
the address label option was nearly as burdensome as full ingredient labeling,
and FD&C Yellow No. 5 could be labeled individually. However, BATF did
impose a requirement mandating disclosure of the use of FD&C Yellow No. 5
in any alcoholic beverage by October 6, 1984.32
Given the ATF's second recision of its labeling regulations, the Court of
Appeals hearing the appeal dismissed all claims without prejudice so that a new
trial could begin based upon the ATF's new rationale in the second recision.33
Thus, CSPI led a new suit in the district court and the cycle began once again.
Again, the district court held that the ATF's recision of its ingredient labeling
regulation violated the FAAA and the APA.34 The court based its decision on
the conclusion that the ATF used basically the same rationale as in the prior
recision so that the latest recision merely represents a predetermined 'mind set'
to reinstate a previous position which was held unlawful.35
The ATF again appealed the district court's decision and this time the ap-
peals court did
32 48 FR. 45549 (October 6, 1983).
Center for Science in the Public Interest, et al., v Donald T. Regan, Secretary
of the Treasury, et al., 726 F.2d 1161 (D.C. D.C. Cir, February 7, 1984).
~ Center for Science in the Public Interes4 et al., v Department of the Trea-
sury, et al., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14329 (D.C. D.C., October 30, 1985).
~ ld, at 15.
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hear the case. The appeals court reversed the district court decision.36 The
court rejected the ATF's conclusion that there was a lack of consumer interest
in ingredient disclosure but did agree that because both basic ingredients and
additives will be substantially transformed by distillation and fermentation in-
gredient labeling would largely be useless to consumers.37 Thus, the court held
that the ATF's recision was based on a justiable and reasoned analysis and did
not violate either the FAAA or the APA. The court also approved the ATF's
case by case approach to health eects of specic ingredients and its requirement
of labeling for the presence of FD&C Yellow No. 538 This decision marked the
end of nearly a decade of court battles over the ATF ingredient labeling policy.
C. Subsequent Action and Current Relationship
The complex relationship between the FDA and the ATF evident in both
the executive and judicial branch actions described above highlights two impor-
tant points. First, it is clear that there was never a clear delineation of the
jurisdictional grounds occupied by the FDA and the ATF. While the FDA did
generally defer to the ATF, there were cases in which the FDA did attempt
to assert its legislatively mandated authority. Second, it is clear that the ATF
actually deferred to the FDA, or at least relied on the FDA, in certain instances
despite the fact that it had been granted sole jurisdiction by the courts. For ex-
ample, the ATF relied on the FDA's regulation of food additives in determining
that the presence of FD&C Yellow No. 5 should be
36 Center for Science in the Public Interest, et al., v Department of the
Treasury, et al., 797 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. August 5, 1986).
~ Id, at 1000.
38 Id, at 1002.
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disclosed on alcoholic beverage labels. Thus, there was a need for the FDA
and the ATF to establish a more structured and detailed relationship after
the nal appeals court decision not only to prevent future conicts but also to
prevent regulatory overlap and duplicity.
The agencies did just this in a de facto way through their interaction with
regard to the labeling of sultes in the food supply. The development of the
sulte labeling policy illustrates a deliberate attempt by the FDA and the ATF
to develop a clear working relationship. The FDA had rst issued a proposed
rule to arm the generally recognized as safe status of sultes on July 9, 1
982.~~ While the FDA was conducting its study of sultes, the ATF proposed a
rule to require reductions of permitted levels of sultes in wine to 275 parts per
million.40 In the preamble to this proposed rule, the ATF stated that if at some
future date the U.S. Food and Drug Administration were to determine that the
sulting of foods and beverages presents a risk to public health and requires
labeling disclosure, ATF [will] promptly propose disclosure in labeling of sulfur
dioxide and sulting agents.4' Thus, the ATF was clearly willing to defer to the
scientic determinations of the FDA as long as it retained control over the nal
form of the labeling regulations.
The FDA issued its nal ruling requiring the declaration of the presence of
sultes at levels greater than 10 ppm on food labels on July 9, 1986.42 In this
ruling, the FDA noted that a wine industry trade association had submitted a
comment to its proposed sulte labeling rule
~ 47 F.R. 29956 (July 9, 1982). 4049 F.R. 37527 (September24, 1984).
~' Id
42 51 F.R. 25012 (July 9, 1986).
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even though the labeling of wines is regulated by the ATF. The FDA stated
that the issues raised in the comment relate directly to wine and have no bearing
on the action that FDA is taking and thus refused to respond to the comment.
This action shows that the FDA was highly aware of the need to clearly delineate
lines ofjurisdiction with the ATF and wished to defer to the ATF on the actual
form of, and requirements for, alcoholic beverage labeling.
The ATF did issue its own nal rule on sulte labeling on September 30, 1
986.~~ In this ruling, the ATF conrmed that it was deferring to the scientic
analysis of the FDA stating that since FDA has determined that the presence of
undeclared sultes in foods and beverages poses a recognized health problem to
a certain class of individuals, ATF believes that the declaration of sultes in the
labeling of alcoholic beverages is necessary.44 The ATF also staked out is own
jurisdictional territory, however, by permitting a label declaration which read
contains sultes rather than requiring a listing of the specic sulting agent
as the FDA rule had done. The ATF also permitted the use of a neck label
containing the sulte declaration in place of a statement printed on the label
itself. Thus, it was clear that while the ATF did agree to defer to the FDA's
scientic analysis, it desired to retain control over the form of alcohol labeling.
This new relationship between the FDA and the ATF was formalized in a
November 30, 1987 memorandum of understanding.45 The stated purpose of this
memorandum was to clarify and to delineate the enforcement responsibilities of
each agency with respect to alcoholic
~ 51 F.R. 34706 (September 30, 1986).
~ Id
~ 52 FR. 45502 (November 30, 1987).
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beverages considered adulterated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938 and for other related purposes.46 Thus, the memorandum
focused on the jurisdictional overlap between the FDA's authority to prevent
adulteration in the food supply under the FDCA and the ATF's more gen-
eral broadly worded mandate under the FAAA. In this memorandum, the AIF
agreed to promulgate labeling regulations when FDA has determined that the
presence of an ingredient in food products, including alcoholic beverages, poses
a recognized public health problem.47 The ATF and the FDA also agreed to
consult on a regular basis concerning the propriety of promulgating regulations
concerning the labeling of other ingredients and substances for alcoholic bever-
ages with the FDA agreeing in particular to upon ATF's request, provide ATF
with a health hazard evaluation with respect to any substance found in alcoholic
beverages. 48
This new inter-agency relationship was conrmed by subsequent regulations
relating to sultes and aspartame. In 1988, the FDA revisited the GRAS level
of sultes in the food supply and determined that those who drink wine or beer
regularly would not be exposed to more than 180 milligrams of additional sulfur
dioxide per day.49 The FDA based this estimate on the proposed limitation
on sulte levels in beer and wine contained in the ATF's 1984 proposed rule.
However, it is evident that the ATF's proposal was motivated by the FDA's
initial study of the GRAS level of sultes. Thus, this shows that the FDA will
take the lead in the scientic
46 Id.
~ Id
48 Id
'~ 53 FR. 51065 (December 19, 1988).
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research necessary to establish the safety and health eects of alcoholic bev-
erages and that the ATF will use this research in developing its labeling regu-
lations.
The ATF's acceptance of this understanding was conrmed by its nal rule
on materials and processes authorized for the production of wine of October 7,
1993 ~ In this ruling, the ATF stated that it had never promulgated a nal ruling
to lower the permitted levels of sultes in the production of wine after its 1984
proposed rule because of the proposal by the Food and Drug Administration to
lower the maximum level of sulting agents in wine from 350 parts per million
to 275 ppm and the fact that AFT was still awaiting nal action by FDA before
proceeding further in this area.,,5' Thus, the ATF conrmed that while it has the
jurisdiction to set the maximum level of sultes in alcoholic beverages it is going
to defer to the FDA's determinations of the GRAS level before it does so. This
shows a clear intent by the ATF to defer to the FDA's scientic determinations
as outlined in the third memorandum of understanding.
The ATF explicitly stated that this is its policy in a nal rule requiring the
disclosure of aspartame in the labeling of malt beverages.52 In this ruling, the
ATF stated that in determining whether there is a need to require label disclo-
sure of specic ingredients in alcoholic beverages, ATF has traditionally utilized
the expertise of the Food and Drug Administration and that the memorandum
of understanding had formalized this policy.53 Thus, both agencies now agree
that
~ 58 FR. 52222 (October 7, 1993).
~ Id, at 52223.
52 58 F.R. 44131 (August 19, 1993).
~ Id.
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the FDA is responsible for considering and evaluating the scientic evidence
related to the health and safety eects of alcoholic beverages and that the ATF
will follow the FDA's lead in promulgating labeling requirements related to
them. Even though this is an area of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, it
appears that the two agencies have nally made their peace and established a
working relationship that is designed to prevent future conict and confusion.
As will be discussed below, the nature of this relationship may have important
implications for the possibility of adding a health claim to wine labels.
Section II. Health Claims on Wine Labels
Given the reliance by the ATF on the scientic analysis of the FDA in
alcoholic beverage labeling regulation for health and safety concerns, it seems
logical for the ATF to also rely on the FDA's scientic analysis for the regulation
of health claims. Thus, it is useful to analyze the FDA regulation of health
claims on food products in order to explore the possibility of a health claim on
wine labels noting the connection between the moderate consumption of wine
and reduced risks of coronary heart disease (CHD). Such an analysis, however,
must contend not only with the jurisdictional overlap of the FDA and the ATF
but also the 1990 Congressional amendment of the FDCA to include specic
provisions governing the regulation of health claims on food products54 and
the more recent 1997 Food and Drug Modernization Act (FDMA) provisions
streamlining the health claims approval process.55 The regulatory action of the
FDA under the 1990 amendments will be analyzed in the rst section below.
The second will then
~ FDCA x403(r)(3).
~ Ill Stat. 2296 (1997).
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discuss the relevance of the FDA and the ATF jurisdictional overlap. Finally,
the third section will apply the FDA regulatory policy and the FDMA provisions
to the consideration of a wine health claim.
A. FDA Regulatory Policy Under the 1990 FDCA Amendments
In the 1990 FDCA amendments, Congress directed the FDA to study 10
specic disease/nutrient relationships for possible health claims. Based upon
its analysis of these 10, the FDA eventually approved eight health claims for
use on food labels.56 The FDA's action on the health claim relating 'diets low in
saturated fat and cholesterol and high in fruits, vegetables, and grain products
containing ber (particularly soluble ber) to reduced risks of coronary heart
disease' is representative of the agency's method of analysis of these 10 health
claims. Since the study of these original 10 relationships, the FDA has consid-
ered and approved several health claims for disease/nutrient relationships that
are either related to, or are subsets of, the original
10. Among these is a health claim relating 'diets high in soluble ber
from whole oats to reduced risks of coronary heart disease'. An analysis of the
FDA's action with respect to both the general dietary ber and the whole oats
claims are particularly useful for considering the possibility of a wine health
claim.
The 1990 Congressional amendment of the FDCA had actually directed the
FDA to examine the relationship between the consumption of general dietary
ber and coronary vascular disease (CVD) instead of CHD. However, when the
FDA made its rst proposed rule permitting
56 These are calcium and osteoporosis (58 F.R. 2665), dietary lipids and
cancer (58 F.R. 2787), sodium and hypertension (58 F.R. 2820), dietary satu-
rated fat and cholesterol and risk of coronary heart disease (58 FR 2739), ber-
containing grain products, fruits, and vegetables and cancer (58 FR. 2537), fruit,
vegetables, and grain products that contain ber (particularly soluble ber) and
risk of coronary heart disease (58 F.R. 2552), fruits and vegetables and cancer
(58 F.R. 2622), and folate and neural tube defects (58 F.R. 53254).
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such a health claim, it restricted the claim to the connection between general
dietary ber and CHD rather than the broader CVD because this link had
the strongest scientic support.57 In the nal regulation permitting the health
claim, the FDA also stated that while there was evidence of a link between the
consumption of specic types of soluble ber, such as oat ber, and reduced risks
of CHD, the various ber sources also appear to have dierent mechanisms of
action and dierent relative magnitudes of eect thus suggesting that caution
is necessary before generalizing from one type of dietary ber to another.58
Therefore, the FDA restricted the health claim to general dietary ber from
fruits, vegetables, and grain products rather than allowing the claim to cover
all types of dietary ber which would include oat ber.
These two actions show that the FDA has taken a very cautious and sci-
entically grounded approach to the analysis of health claims. Rather than
seeking to expand the scope of any health claim, the FDA has sought to tailor
claims as narrowly as possible so that they stand on the greatest scientic sup-
port. This approach accords with the 1990 FDCA amendments which direct
the FDA to approve a health claim only when the totality of publicly available
scientic evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in
a manner which is consistent with generally recognized scientic procedures and
principles) [shows] that there is signicant scientic agreement, among experts
qualied by scientic training and experience to evaluate such claims, that the
claim is supported.59
~~56 F.R. 60582 (November21, 1991).
58
58 F.R. 2552 (January 6, 1993), at 2561.
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It is also important to note that the FDA required that the general di-
etary ber health claim be made in the context of a diet low in saturated fat
and cholesterol. Comments to the FDA's proposed rule had stated that this
requirement implicitly rejected authoritative government reports such as Na-
tional Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) pamphlets which connected the
consumption of soluble dietary ber alone to reduced cholesterol levels and thus
reduced risks of heart disease. In response to this criticism, the FDA stated
that these comments distorted the government reports by failing to acknowl-
edge important contributions to reduced risk of disease by the wide variety of
nutrients and non-nutritive substances present in diets high in fruits, vegetables,
and grain products and by ignoring the fact that the NCEP pamphlets also rec-
ommended a habitual pattern of eating that is consistently low in saturated
fatty acids, total fat, and cholesterol.60
Thus, the FDA concluded that the statement that 'diets low in saturated fat
and cholesterol and high in fruits, vegetables, and grain products that contain
ber (particularly soluble ber) are related to a reduced risk of coronary heart
disease' was most consistent with the available scientic evidence and did not
contradict ocial government statements.6' Furthermore, the FDA stated that
the general dietary ber health claim could state that such diets were consistent
with the U.S. Dietary Guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture and the Department of Health and Human 62 Thus, it is clear that the
FDA
60 58 F.R. 2552, at 2564.
61 Id, at 2572.
62
Id, at 2574.
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may require that health claims be placed within the context of an overall
diet that accords with other ocial government recommendations before it will
sanction a specic health claim.
At the same time that the FDA published its nal decisions with respect to
the original 10 nutrient/disease relationships, it also published general regula-
tions for all future health claims.63 Among these regulations, was a requirement
that any food making a health claim have 10 percent or more of the Daily Refer-
ence Value (DRV) for Vitamin A, Vitamin C, iron, calcium, protein, or ber per
serving prior to nutrient fortication.64 The FDA quickly recognized, however,
that this requirement would prevent food products that have been specially for-
mulated relative to a specic disease condition (e.g. sugarless gum and cavities)
but which have limited nutritional value from making health claims.65 Thus, the
FDA modied its regulations to state that the 10 percent requirement would
only apply if it had not been specically waived by regulation.
The FDA soon used this exemption possibility to modify the health claim
for general dietary ber and CHD.66 In this ruling, the FDA noted that it was
concerned that health claims are not being used as extensively as they could
be, despite the fact that many foods qualify for such claims. The FDA stated
that the National Food Processors Association (NFPA) had alleged that the 10
percent requirement arbitrarily prohibited some common fruits, vegetables, and
other wholesome and nutritious food from making health claims related to CHD
and that it
63 58 F.R. 2478 (January 6, 1993); 21 CFR x 100, et seq.
64 21 CFR 10l.14(e)(6), emphasis added.
65 58 F.R. 44036 (August 18, 1993).
66
60 F.R. 66206 (December21, 1995).
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was modifying its dietary ber health claim to rectify this situation.67
Then the FDA proposed that fruit and vegetable products comprised solely
of fruits and vegetables, enriched grain products that conform to a standard
of identity, and bread that conforms to the standard of identity for enriched
bread except that it contains whole wheat or other grain products not permitted
under that standard, that do not meet the 10 percent nutrient contribution
requirement, but that meet all other aspects of the health claim, should be
permitted to bear a health claim.68 The FDA stated that it would limit this
exception to those food products composed solely of whole fruits and vegetables,
and those grain based food products which conformed to a standard of identity,
so that food products which may raise the level of certain other nutrients, such
as fat, cholesterol, and sodium would not be able to make the health claim. The
FDA reasoned that otherwise there would be a potential for health claims which
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the health claim and incompatible
with current dietary guidelines. 69
This action demonstrates that the FDA will use the regulatory exibility
which was built into the health claims approval process in order to broaden
the range of foods allowed to make health claims when it feels that doing so
is benecial to the general health of the American public. Most notably, the
FDA's idea of what is benecial to the health of the general public seems to
be driven by those disease/food relationships for which there is strong scientic
support and those foods which meet the standards of a healthy diet as dened
by the U.S. Dietary
at 66211.
68 Id, at 66213.
69
Id.
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Guidelines. Thus, the FDA seems to conceive of the purpose of health claim
regulation as reinforc[ing] the Surgeon General's recommendations and help[ing]
Americans to maintain a balanced and healthful diet.70
The FDA's action approving a health claim noting the connection between
the consumption of oat bran and reduced risks of CHD illustrates further nu-
ances in its regulatory policy. First, the FDA agreed to permit a shortened
health claim which merely noted the existence of a relationship 'between diets
high in oat bran and oatmeal and reduced risk of heart disease' as long as there
was a statement referring consumers to the location of the full health claim
that placed this statement within the context of a diet low in saturated fat and
cholesterol.7' The FDA allowed the abbreviated claim at the request of industry
and because it felt that the dietary message could be eectively communicated
by including a statement referring to the location of the full claim. However,
the FDA did note that it did not intend for the abbreviated message to suggest
to consumers that adding oats to the diet was the only dietary modication
necessary to help them reduce risk of CHD.72 Thus, the FDA was concerned
with preventing the public from perceiving that oats and oatmeal were magic
bullets for reducing CHD.
Second, the FDA did not mandate specic language for the claim but instead
provided a model claim which included the word 'may.' For example, in a
subsequent ruling on health claims for all forms of soluble ber, FDA provided
a sample oat bran claim which read soluble
70 Id, at 66208, quoting, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Nu-
trition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 101st Congress, 2d Sess., Report
101-538 (June 13, 1990), at 9-10.
~' 62 F.R. 3584 (January 23, 1997).
72 Id, at 3594.
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ber from foods such as oat bran in Brand Name Cereal, as part of a diet
low in saturated fat and cholesterol, may reduce the risk of heart disease.73 The
FDA stated that it approved the use of the word 'may' because it agreed with
industry that using 'may' to relate the ability of oat bran or oatmeal to reduce
the risk of heart disease is intended to reect the multifactorial nature of the
disease.74 This shows that while the FDA did not want to mislead the public
about the benets of oat bran, it was willing to tolerate a claim which contained
words conveying shades of meaning.
Third, the FDA required that any food making a health claim for oat bran
contain at least .75 g per serving even though there was no DRV for soluble
ber.75 This was a departure from the previous policy under which the FDA
had used the denition of what constituted a product that was 'high in' a
particular nutrient as the minimum qualifying level for allowing a health claim.
The FDA did note in a subsequent ruling on health claims for psyllium ber that
it does intend to establish a DRV for soluble ber, and, once that rule making
is completed, assuming it results in a DRV, [it will] revisit the requirements of
the oat bran minimum qualifying level.76 However, this shows that the FDA
is willing to approve a health claim even without a denitive standard for the
appropriate level of consumption of a food in the generally recommended daily
diet.
Finally, even though the FDA's analysis of the benets of oat bran and
oatmeal was
~ 62 F.R. 15343 (March 31, 1997).
~ 62 F.R. 3584.
~ Id, at 3592.
76 62 F.R. 28234 (May 22, 1997), at 28241.
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based on the presence of b-glucan soluble ber in oats, it stated that it is
premature to authorize a broader claim for soluble ber from certain foods based
merely on the present of b-glucan in those foods. Instead, the FDA will require
documented proof of the health benets from the consumption of any specic
food, even if those benets are derived from b-glucan-like soluble ber, before it
will approve a health claim for that food.77 Thus, although the FDA exhibited
a great deal of exibility with respect to its approval of a health claim for oat
bran it still stuck to its rigorous scientic standards by refusing to allow other
food products containing soluble ber to piggyback on oat bran's health claim.
The FDA demonstrated its commitment to this policy in its approval of a health
claim for soluble ber from psyllium husks, which is similar to bglucan soluble
ber from whole oats, and reduced risks of CHD by requiring separate scientic
proof of a connection between the consumption of psyllium and reduced risks
of CHD.78
H. Relevance of the FDA and the ATF Jurisdictional Overlap
Before automatically applying the FDA method of analysis of health claims
for food to health claims for wine, it is necessary to consider the impact of the
jurisdictional overlap between the FDA and the ATF with respect to alcoholic
beverage labeling. On their face, the BrownForman decision and the language
of the FAAA indicate that the ATF has exclusive jurisdiction over all alcoholic
beverage labeling. This would mean that the ATF would also have exclusive
jurisdiction over the regulation of health claims on alcoholic beverage labels.
Indeed, the ATF regulations promulgated under the FAAA do address this issue
to some degree. The ATF
~ 62 F.R. 3584, at 3587. 78 62 F.R. 28234 (May 22, 1997).
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regulations state that:
Labels shall not contain any statement, design, representation, pictorial rep-
resentation, or device representing that the use of [alcoholic beverages] has cura-
tive or therapeutic eects if such statement is untrue in any particular or tends
to create a misleading impression.79
Because this regulation does not prohibit health claims, however, it would
seem that non-misleading health claims would be permitted.
Despite this regulation, the ATF has never permitted a health claim on
alcoholic beverages. In an industry circular published in response to inquiries
about the possibility of health claims, the ATF did acknowledge that there
is a growing body of scientic research and other data that seems to provide
evidence that lower levels of drinking decrease the risk of death from coronary
artery disease.80 The ATF stated in this circular that it intended to engage in
rule making and that pending the initiation of rule making proceedings, ATF
will continue to evaluate health claims made in the labeling and advertising of
alcoholic beverages on a case-by-case basis.8' Nevertheless, the ATF expressly
discouraged any attempts to obtain case-by-case approval by declaring that any
health claim would have to be voluminously qualied and that it considers it
extremely unlikely that such a balanced claim would t on a normal alcoholic
beverage label.82
In response to the lack of action by the ATF, the Competitive Enterprise
Institute (CEI)
27 CFR x4.39(h); 5.42(b)(8); 7.29(e).
80
Health Claim in the Labeling and Advertising ofAlcoholic Beverages, BATF
Industry Circular No.
IC-93-8 (August 8, 1993).
81 Id
82
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petitioned the ATF on May 9, 1995 to adopt a rule allowing the use of
the statement that 'There is signicant evidence that moderate consumption
of alcoholic beverages may reduce the risk of heart disease' on all alcoholic
beverage labels.83 The ATF acknowledged the receipt of CEI's petition but took
no further action. When Consumer Alert (CA), another consumer advocacy
group, sent the ATF a letter of support for CEI's petition, the ATF responded
with a letter stating that it believed that such health statements would likely be
misleading and that it still did intend to engage in rule making on the issue.84
In response to the ATF's inaction, CEI and CA led suit against the ATF on
October 29, 1996.
The CEI/CA lawsuit contains three allegations. First, CEI/CA allege that
the ATF's action violated the First Amendment because its refusal to approve
labels containing a health claim violated the rights of speakers (i.e. producers
and sellers of alcoholic beverages) and listeners (i.e. consumers) to receive truth-
ful, non-misleading information.85 The suit also alleges that the ATF's action
violates the FAAA and regulation 4.3 9(h) promulgated thereunder. Finally,
the suit alleges that the ATF's failure to respond to CEI's petition in a timely
manner violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
In support of its position, CEI/CA noted that more than 100 studies con-
ducted over the previous decade have concluded that moderate drinking reduces
the risk of contracting
83
Competitive Enterprise Institute and Consumer Alert v. Robert E. Rubin, in
his ocial capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Trea-
sury, and John W. Magaw, in his ocial capacity as Director of the Bureau
ofAlcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Complaint led with the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, at 7.
84 Id
85 Id, at 10.
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cardiovascular disease and reduces overall mortality.86 CEI/CA also cited a
1992 New England Journal of Medicine literature review which stated that 'there
is a substantial body of observational epidemiologic evidence to suggest that
moderate consumption of alcohol reduces the risk of heart disease.'87 Finally,
CEI/CA noted that the health benets of moderate drinking were ocially
recognized by the U.S. Government in the form of the U.S. Dietary Guidelines
which state that current evidence suggests that moderate drinking is associated
with a lower risk for coronary heart disease in some individuals.88 As of the time
of this writing, this suit has not yet been resolved.
Given the ATF's intransigence in approving health claims for alcoholic bev-
erages, it is useful to consider whether a case can be made for FDA jurisdiction
over the issue. The third memorandum of understanding between the FDA and
the ATF may be particularly relevant. As noted above, this memorandum de-
lineated a clear working relationship between the two agencies with respect to
health and safety labeling of alcoholic beverages under which the ATF would
defer to the FDA's scientic determinations. As the regulatory action taken
with respect to sultes and aspartame showed, the ATF has explicitly relied on
the FDA's scientic determinations in regulating the content of alcoholic bev-
erage labels. Thus, it may be logical for the ATF to rely on the FDA's analysis
with respect to health claims for alcoholic beverages also. After all, the FDA's
regulation of health claims is clearly grounded in the same sorts of scientic
86 Id, at 4.
87 Id, at 5, citing, Manson, et al, The Primary Prevention of Myocardial
Infarction, 326 New England Journal of Medicine 1406 (1992), at 1412.
88
USDA and HHS, Dietary Guidelines for Americans (4th ed., Dec. 1995), at
40.
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evaluations required in health and safety regulation.
There is precedent for proposing this sort of regulatory interaction between
the FDA and the ATF. A similar relationship was proposed by the Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the USDA with respect to health claims for
meat and poultry. Prior to 1994, the FSIS did not allow meat and poultry
product labels to include health claims explicitly linking the consumption of
these foods to diet-related diseases but instead only permitted label statements
which informed consumers that a specic food could be part of a diet which
met the general U.S. Dietary Guidelines. However, in response to the FDA's
approval of health claims for food, the FSIS proposed a rule which would result
in the adoption of regulations which would parallel those promulgated by the
FDA for food health claims on meat and poultry.89
The FSIS stated that its was proposing a system which paralleled the FDA
system because it felt that it is important to communicate consistent messages
about dietary goals, and about the role meat and poultry products can play in
meeting dietary recommendations to consumers.90 While the F SIS did consider
the possibility of merely permitting the use of all health claims already autho-
rized by the FDA, it instead decided to propose its own regulations. However,
the FSIS did state that it intended to rely heavily on FDA's decisions about the
validity and signicance of the relationship between the substances and diseases
that are subjects of this proposal, and [will] continue to do so for future claims.9'
Thus, the FSIS proposed to
89 s~ F.R. 27144 (May 25, 1994).
at 27150.
~' id, at 27146.
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authorize health claims for meat and poultry products based on prior FDA
scientic analysis.92
The system proposed by the FSIS parallels the FDA system in several re-
spects. For example, the FSIS stated that it would use the FDA denition of
what constituted a health claim, the FDA 10 percent RDV nutrient level rule
for prohibiting health claims, the FDA denition of 'high in' nutrient levels for
establishing minimum qualifying levels, and the FDA policy of allowing produc-
ers to petition the agency for approval of health claims by submitting proposed
label statements with supporting scientic evidence. Thus, the FSIS basically
proposed to adopt the FDA system of health claim regulation wholesale with-
out any real signicant change. Based on this action, it appears logical for the
ATF to do the same for the labeling of health claims on alcoholic beverages. In
fact, perhaps the ATF should merely defer to the FDA health claim regulatory
system, as the FSIS had considered doing, because the ATF already does so for
other scientic determinations related to the labeling of alcoholic beverages.
C. Application of the FDA Regulatory Policy and the FDMA Pro-
visions
If the ATF were to defer to the FDA on the labeling of health claims for
alcoholic beverages, any health claim would have to meet the requirements of
the FDA health claim regulatory system. As shown by the FDA's limitation of
dietary ber health claims to CHD, rather than the broader CVD, and the s
refusal to allow the scientic evidence supporting
92 Specically, the FSIS proposed to allow health claims related to the asso-
ciation between the following:
adequate calcium intake and reduced risk of osteoporosis, diets low in fat
and reduced risk of cancer, sodium reduction and reduced risk of high blood
pressure, reduction in dietary saturated fat and cholesterol and reduced risk
of coronary heart disease, diets low in fat and high in ber containing grain
products, fruits, and vegetables, and reduced risk of cancer, diets low in satu-
rated fat and cholesterol and high in fruits, vegetables, and grain products that
contain dietary ber and reduced risk of coronary heart disease, substances in
diets low in fat and high in fruits and vegetables (foods that are low in fat and
may contain dietary ber, vitamin A, or vitamin C) and reduced risk of cancer,
and folate and reduced risk of neural tube birth defects. Id, at 27 147-48.
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the oat bran health claim to support claims for other soluble bers, the FDA
would probably only permit a claim which was narrowly tailored to rely on the
strongest possible scientic evidence. While the CEI/CA suit argues that there
is a consensus for the claim that the moderate consumption of all alcoholic
beverages is associated with reduced risks of CHD, the strongest consensus and
greatest volume of research relates to the claim that moderate consumption of
wine is associated with reduced risks of CHD.93 Thus, it should be easier to
support a health claim on wine than any other alcoholic beverage.
A second requirement for a health claim which is evident from the FDA
regulation of the dietary ber health claim is that the health claim be placed
in the context of general dietary recommendations. This is in fact what the
U.S. Dietary Guidelines already does with respect to alcoholic beverages by
virtue of the fact that the Guidelines state that there is evidence to suggest
that moderate drinking of alcoholic beverages is associated with a lower risk
of CHD. The fact that the Guidelines is designed to provide the public with
information about what the government considers to be a healthy diet, in eect,
places this link within the context of the general dietary recommendations of
the U.S. government.
In fact, the Wine Institute, a winery trade association, has proposed label
statements which would read 'To learn the health eects of moderate wine con-
sumption, send for the federal government's Dietary Guidelines for Americans.'94
While this proposal has been
See, e.g., Renaud, S., and DeLorgeil, M., Wine Alcohol, Platelets and the
French Paradox for Coronary Heart Disease, 339 The Lancet 1523 (1992);
Kondo, K, et al., Inhibition of Oxidation of Low-Density Lipoprotein with Red
Wine, 344 The Lancet 1152 (1994); Fuhrman, B., et al., Consumption of red
wine with meals reduces the susceptibility of human plasma and low density lip
oprotein to lipid peroxidation, 61 American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 549
(1995).
Anderson, Curt, Wine-label revision seen as pro-drinking, Seattle Times
(July 21, 1997).
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opposed by groups such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest and
the American Medical Association, ATF Director John Magaw is on record as
saying that such a statement is neutral in tone, does not make claims about
health and drinking, and would likely be approved.95 Thus, any health claim
for wine could state that the connection between moderate wine consumption
and reduced risks of CHD only occur within the context of a diet that meets the
U.S. Dietary Guideline recommendations. Such language would also address the
FDA concern that any single food not be viewed as a magic bullet for preventing
heart disease which the FDA noted in its regulation of the oat bran health claim.
Even if a health claim on wine did satisfy these standards, there are still
several objections which could be made to such a claim. First, the word mod-
erate may be viewed as not specic enough in that it does not convey a sense
of how much alcohol is necessary to gain the benecial health eects. However,
scientic research has shown that the benecial eects of wine result from the
consumption of one to two 5 ounce drinks a day and that with more than two
drinks per day there is a statistically signicant increase in the incidence of
cancer.96 In fact, the U.S. Dietary Guidelines denes moderate consumption as
no more than one drink per day for women and two drinks per day for men.97
Thus, it is possible to precisely dene the word moderate in a health claim for
wine. And as the FDA action with regard to oat bran shows, the FDA has been
willing to approve health claims even in the absence of ocially dened DRV's.
~ Id
96
Camargo, C., et al., Moderate Alcohol Consumption and Risk for Angina
Pectoris of Myocardial
Infarction in US. Male Physicians, 126 Annals of Internal Medicine 372
(March 1, 1997).
U.S. Dietary Guidelines, supra note 88, at 40.
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Thus, the lack of an exact denition of moderate may not be as troublesome
as it rst appears.
A second objection to a health claim on wine is that this would encourage
the consumption of a potentially dangerous product which has no real nutri-
tional value. However, the U.S. Dietary Guidelines states that alcohol should
not be consumed by children, adolescents, those of any age who cannot limit
their intake, women who are trying to conceive or who are pregnant, individ-
uals who plan to drive or take part in activities requiring attention and skill,
and individuals using prescription and over the counter medicines.98 Thus, the
statement referring to the U.S. Dietary Guidelines which places wine consump-
tion within the context of a healthy diet also would serve to alert those who
should not drink about the dangers of doing so. This seems sucient given the
s approval of shortened health claims that contain references to the location
of complete information in the regulation of the oat bran health claim. The
Guidelines also explicitly states that alcoholic beverages supply calories but few
or no nutrients.99 Thus, again this information would be accurately conveyed
by a reference to the Guidelines. And as the regulation of the general dietary
ber health claim shows, the FDA is willing to approve health claims for foods
that do not necessarily meet RDV's or that have limited nutritional value.
This leads to a nal objection to a health claim for wine. This would be
that because the mechanism by which wine supposedly reduces the risk of heart
disease is not precisely understood, it cannot really be proven and distinguished
from other mechanisms which might be at work in wine or other alcoholic bev-
erages. Thus, as was the case with oat bran and psyllium
981d, at4l.
~ Id, at 40.
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ber, the FDA should not permit a health claim until it is possible to prove
the health eects of
each individual alcoholic beverage. However, scientic research has begun to
suggest that the organic compound resveratrol, a naturally occurring fungicide
present in many plants including wine grapes, may be the substance in wine
which improves human cholesterol proles and thus reduces the risk of CHD.100
Furthermore, any health claim for wine could be qualied with the word 'may'
to reect the multi-factor nature and possible ambiguity of the association be-
tween wine consumption and reduced risk of CHD as was done with the oat
bran health claim. This would also accurately reect the U.S. Dietary Guide-
lines statement that current evidence suggests an association between alcoholic
beverage consumption and reduced risks of CHD.
Given the FDA regulatory policy toward health claims on food, it appears
that a health claim on wine labels which stated that
Scientic evidence suggests that there may be a connection between the
moderate consumption of wine, (dened as no more than one drink per day for
women and two for men) within the context of a healthy diet as recommended
by the U.S. Dietary Guidelines, and reduced risks of coronary heart disease,
would meet the FDA requirements for health claims as applied under the
1990 FDCA amendments. If that were not the case, however, the 1997 FDMA
health claims provisions may provide an alternative ground for gaining approval
for a wine health claim.
The FDMA amended x403(r)(3) of the FDCA by adding a new subparagraph
which authorizes the use of health claims on food labels which have not been
pre-authorized by the
00
Siemann, B.C., Natural Compound in Wine Can Lower Cholesterol Levels,
43 American Journal of Enology Viticulture 49 (1992).
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FDA.'0' There are four requirements which must be met in order to justify
the use of such a
claim. These requirements are the following:
1) the claim must be published as an authoritative statement by a scien-
tic body of the U.S. government with ocial responsibility for public health
protection or human nutrition research or the National Academy of Sciences,
2) at least 120 days before the use of the claim on labels in interstate com-
merce, a notice of the claim and its authoritative basis must be submitted to
the FDA,
3) the claim and the food must meet FDCA provisions under x403(r)(3)(A)(ii)
requiring that the food does not contain any nutrient in an amount which in-
creases the risk of disease, x403(a) prohibiting false or misleading claims, and
x201(n) dening misleading labeling, and
4) the claim must be stated in a manner that accurately represents the
authoritative statement and enables the public to comprehend the information
and to understand its signicance in the context of a total daily diet
Under the new FDCA x403(r)(3)(D) introduced by the FDMA, a claim which
meets the above requirements can be used on food labels until either the FDA
issues a regulation stating that, or a U.S. District Court determines in an en-
forcement proceeding that, the health claim does not meet the requirements of
statutory provisions.
It may be the case that the U.S. Dietary Guidelines statement that scientic
evidence suggests a link between moderate consumption of alcohol and reduced
risks of coronary heart disease would qualify as an authoritative statement of a
U.S. government scientic agency responsible for human health under the new
x403(r)(3)(C). While the USDA may not be a scientic agency, the Guidelines
were established by direction of the National Nutrition
'o~ FDCA x403(r)(3)(C).
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Monitoring and Related Research Act of 1990.102 This act states that the
Guidelines shall be promoted by each Federal agency in carrying out any Federal
food, nutrition, or health program.'03 Thus, it seems at least arguable that the
Guidelines do constitute an authoritative scientic statement of the U.S. gov-
ernment in which case they would provide sucient grounds for making a health
claim on wine without waiting for direct FDA or ATF regulatory approval.
In fact, x403(r)(3)(C) was added to the FDCA by Congress precisely because
of the regulatory delay in approving health claims. The House Committee Re-
port stated that a primary motivation for the new statutory provisions was the
substantial delay which had occurred in the FDA's approval of the health claim
connecting folic acid and neural tube defects. While the Center for Disease Con-
trol had initially recommended that women of childbearing age consume folic
acid in order to help prevent neural tube defects in September of 1992, the FDA
did not issue a ruling for health claim labeling to this eect until March 1996.
Thus, Congress felt that it was important to establish a mechanism by which
there would be a presumption of validity with respect to claims that are appro-
priately based on statements by such authoritative scientic bodies in order to
facilitate public access to health information.'04 Given the ATF's intransigence
in approving a health claim for wine labels despite the overwhelming scientic
evidence suggesting a link between its moderate consumption and reduced risks
of CHD, the new statutory provisions might justiably be read as covering a
wine health claim as well.
102 ~ USCS xx5301, et seq.
103 ~ USCS x5341(a)(1).
'o~ H.R. Rep. No. 105-306 (1997), at 14-16.
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Conclusion
The FDA and the ATF have a long history of intertwined and often conict-
ing jurisdiction over the regulation of alcohol labeling. While they do seem to
have reached a jurisdictional peace in which the ATF retains primary control
over alcohol labeling while utilizing the FDA's scientic expertise, it may be
time for another skirmish between the two. For it is clear that the ATF has
been dragging its feet with respect to a potential health claim noting a connec-
tion between the moderate consumption of wine and reduced risks of CHD. The
FDA health claim regulatory structure would provide a much more transparent
framework in which a scientic debate over the merits of such a claim could
occur. The most recent modications of the FDCA show a clear Congressional
intent to facilitate the use of health claims on food labels throughout the food
supply. Thus, perhaps it is time to end the ATF's use of its regulatory power
to stie the consideration of a health claim on wine.
38